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Abstract
This paper presents an analytical framework for studying the impact of
mandatory labelling regulation for transgenic food. We compare Genetically
Modiﬁed (GM) and conventional crop markets and identify gains for food
processors prior to mandatory labelling and losses after this measure for the
GM market. Nevertheless, food processors could obtain gains for conventional
products after market disgregation. Finally, consumers will be worse oﬀ both
for conventional and GM foods unless qualities other than changes to prices
are considered.
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11 Introduction
Mandatory labelling regulation for transgenic food has been adopted in recent years
for the European Union (EU) following environmentalists’ and consumers’ concern
about Genetically Modiﬁed Organisms (GMO).
This controversial public policy response could be economically justiﬁed if it were
expected as a result of an increase in the eﬃciency of the market. Recent studies
(Giannakas and Fulton, 2002; Lence and Hayes, 2002; Lapan and Moschini, 2002)
show that although agricultural biotechnology innovations have the potential to im-
prove eﬃciency, some agents can actually be made worse oﬀ by the innovation. Two
factors could inﬂuence the diﬀerences in welfare eﬀects of GM technology adoption by
regions: a) the relatively high aversion to GM technology in Europe, b) the existence
of market imperfections in one or more stages of the supply chain that prevent the
transmission of cost savings associated with the new technology to consumers. This
lack of price reductions for GM products, is an opportunity for EU institutions to
rationalize mandatory labelling.
Nevertheless, the EU has net importer position on some GM industrial crops, like
corn. Some criticisms reveal that the EU policy could be maintaining standards of
food safety in a way that unfairly discriminates against foreign suppliers. As there
are no international food safety standards that really apply to them, concerning GM
products, some countries, like those in the EU, invoke the “precautionary principle”
which allows the setting of standards provisionally where relevant scientiﬁc evidence
is lacking. It is therefore argued that this principle is being abused in order to protect
less eﬃcient domestic producers from foreign competition (Sheldon, M., 2002).
Besides the view about regulation and its eﬀects, holding that governments should
and can regulate in order to correct market failures and increase welfare, there is the
opposite view that various interest groups are aﬀected diﬀerently by regulation. These
interest groups compete to inﬂuence legislation and capture a regulatory body (G.
Stigler, 1971)1.
The main aim of this paper is to present an analytical framework for the evaluation
of the welfare eﬀects of the EU policy relating to Labelling GMO in the Agricultural
Sector, for consumers and other actors in the agrifood chain: European manufacturers
and farmers. By identifying the distribution of gains and loses, we will evaluate
whether the government intervention through regulation is economically justiﬁed.
Identifying the costs and beneﬁts of regulation is not a simple task, as it involves
diverse actors in the agro-biotechnology chain, all invocating their own rights and so-
cial interests. At the beginning of the chain, the joint activity of agro-biotechnology
enterprises together with public research institutes and universities are responsible
for the generation of knowledge. The diﬀu s i o no fi n n o v a t i o ni nt h ef o r mo fan e wg e -
1The interest group theory is a generalization of the capture theory of the Chicago School of
Economics. In this interest group theory either ﬁrms or consumers can capture a regulatory body
and subvert the purpose of the law.
2netically modiﬁed seed variety is conducted by seed companies, usually multinational
enterprises2. Once farmers adopt the biotechnology input, this is ﬁnally processed by
manufacturers who are commercialized in the domestic market and the products are
either consumed by European citizens, or exported. Each of these market participant
decisions aﬀect each other, e.g. negative public attitudes in the EU towards trans-
genic foods which imply health and environmental risks, inﬂuence not only the rate
at which diﬀerentiation occurs in the market, but also that at which new technologies
are adopted by farmers and to what extent innovations occur in the biotechnology
ﬁrms. In the same way, government regulatory actions at each stage, -which continue
to advance along with advances in biotechnology in the EU.-, play an important role
in allocating costs and beneﬁts of biotechnology innovations among agents.
Section 2 develops the recent changes in the European markets and legislation con-
cerning GMOs. Section 3. describes the theoretical framework. Finally, we present
the conclusions.
2B a c k g r o u n d
Consumer concern about Genetically Modiﬁed (GM) products may be expected to
aﬀect consumption decisions and to inﬂuence the public policy response demanded
by consumers. In Europe, Eurobarometer surveys3 reveal that public expectations
of non-medical biotechnology are moderate and are heavily inﬂuenced by the social
values and ethics of citizens . Nevertheless, there are large diversity in public opinion
at the national level on the use of genetically GM for meat products or crops. When
asked speciﬁcally to what extent they would approve of growing meat from cell cul-
tures so that we do not have to slaghter farm animals, more than one in two conveys
their opposition.
In addition, price-reduction beneﬁts from biotechnology seem minor to consumers
in the EU, while unknown dangers are exacerbated, both by a lack of information
and doubts about the ability of governments to regulate the safety of the food supply.
Several cases, with dramatic consequences for the European citizens, such as the scare
involving mad cow disease in Great Britain, dioxine poisoning in 1999 in Belgium and
listeria in cheese products in France in 2000, have increased the level of awareness
and information on public health safety of European consumers.4
2See Fernández Díez M.C.and Corripio Gil Delgado M.R. (2004)
3Eurobarometer 58.0 “Europeans and Biotechnology in 2002” (2nd Edi-
tion: March 21st 2003) George Gaskell*, Nick Allum and Sally Stares
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/ebs_177_en.pdf
Special Eurobarometer 225. Social Values, Science and Technology, June 2005
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf
4Huﬀman,W.E. et al. (2003) present an alternative explanation for Europeans negligible demand
for GM foods: NGOs, largely Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have been more prevalent there
than in the US, disseminating larger amounts of negative GM-information, and creating skepticism
3As a result, some food retailers and manufacturers have moved quickly to establish
voluntary standards and labels relevant to their own market situation. Voluntary
standards have been set to zero or near zero tolerance for biotechnology products
leading to “non-GMO” or “GMO-free” claims. If voluntary GM-free or non GMO
labels become standard, in this way, mandatory labels and thresholds could become
practically irrelevant (Kalaitzandonakes, 2000). As a result, mandatory biotechnology
labelling has been questioned and qualiﬁed as an unwise policy5.W h y w o u l d E U
g o v e r n m e n t sa l s od e c i d et h a ti n f o r m a t i o na b o u tG Mp r o d u c t ss h o u l db el a b e l e d ? .
Economic theory justiﬁes the “consumers’ right to know” when the market does not
supply enough information to allow consumers to make consumption choices reﬂecting
their individual preferences (asymmetric or missing information). In this sense, the
market does not work eﬃciently and social costs and beneﬁts may suggest a diﬀerent
labelling outcome than the one resulting from a private ﬁrms’ labelling decision.
If GM products have been considered a negative attribute for European con-
sumers, that is, a “strictly inferior” product as compared to the traditional counter-
part products, and the superior product cannot be distinguished from the inferior
one, there will be a problem of asymmetric or missing information. In this situa-
tion, producers possess knowledge of relevant information about the product that
consumers do not —asymmetric information- (e.g. contains GMOs) or the market
information does not exist or is contradictory — imperfect information- (e.g. health
consequences of consumption). In these cases Akerlof demonstrated in 1970 in the
“lemons” model, that regulation may be desirable to maintain product diversity6.I n
our case, GMO products and GMO free products. Government intervention could
also reduce producers incentives by oﬀering too high a proportion of low quality
products. Mandatory labelling would address this information problem.
First generation of Agrobiotechnology products refer to GM crops that increase
yield or reduce costs for farmers -e.g. improve crop resistance and tolerance to un-
favorable weather and environmental conditions (reducing risk) or enhance environ-
mental quality (reducing pesticide use). These characteristics cannot be observed
by consumers, and are credence attributes (Nelson , 1970)7. GM products could be
and doubt about GM technology.
5Conko, Gregory (2002): Eat, Drink and Be Merry: Why Mandatory Biotech Food Labelling is
Unnecessary. Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon. This study presents some drawbacks of mandatory
labels: could be misunderstood by consumers as a warning about some important diﬀerence (when
they do not), problems of information overload and costs expected for producers of non-biotech
foods, as segregation will occur and every ingredient will need to be tested for “purity” at each step
of the production process.
6There have been only a few cases where the owners of the GM products have labeled and
proactively marketed their products to consumers (Phillips and Corkindale, 2002)
7Nelson, P. (1970): “Information and Consumer Behaviour”, Journal of Political Economy, 81:
729-754, considered a typology of goods based on the consumers’ capability of attributes detection:
before consumption (search goods); after consumption (experience goods) and those whose attributes
cannot be detected after consumption (credence goods).
First generation applications in agro biotechnology (e.g. crop resistance to plagues) are considered
4identiﬁed as an asymmetric information case, as GM foods contain negative credence
attributes for consumers. Labelling (or certiﬁcation) becomes a way to transform a
credence attribute into a search one (Caswell, J. A & E.M. Mojduszka, 1996). But
also as an imperfect information problem, there is missing information about po-
tential health and environmental risks for consumers. These long term eﬀects are
unknown and scientiﬁco p i n i o n sd i ﬀer about their probabilities.8
In such a case, the government would require full disclosure of even preliminary or
contradictory information, and consumers’ greater access to information would result
in an increase in the eﬃciency of the market .
Besides these potential beneﬁts of mandatory labelling for European consumers,
this regulation is expected to have relevant eﬀects on other actors involved in the
international trade and agrifood chain, see Figure 1.
Exporters of GMO crops to supply food processors and inputs like seeds to the
crop market, have been aﬀected by EU restriction on the GM trade. International
legal agreements try to prevent these restrictions on international trade.There are
only a few international legal agreements setting out the World Trade Organization
(WTO) legal framework regarding trade in GM products. But the EU have reinforced
the measures applying the protection of human, animal and plant life or health. The
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) allows countries to adopt their own
standards with reference to international trade but these restrictions must be based
on science. Measures should not arbitrarily or unjustiﬁably discriminate between
countries where identical or similar conditions prevail and should not be applied in
a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. The
agreement suggests the use of international standards when possible. The WTO
establishes that GMO products that pose a scentiﬁcally justiﬁcable hazard or that
are novel may be legitimately subject to a mandatory labelling standard such that
at-risk groups or consumers who wish to exercise their right to know about a novel
GMO product may identify such products in the marketplace. Yet, a mandatory
labelling standard for GMOs that pose no scientiﬁcally justiﬁcable hazard and that
are substantially equivalent to products already in the market place would clearly
contravene the non-discrimination principle (Isaac and Kerr, 2003).
Nowadays, in the EU there are fourteen GM plants produced by diﬀerent compa-
nies that have been approved for commercialisation so far. Under Council Directive
90/220/EEC several GMOs were approved for launching on the market, but from
1999 to 2003 no authorisation was given, either pursuant to the previous Directive
1990/220/EEC, or to the present Directive 2001/18/EC. This de facto moratorium on
credence goods, as consumers cannot obviously perceive those gains. Nevertheless, third generation
of agrobiotechnology applications (as fat reduction in oil) could be considered as an experience good.
In that situation, government intervention through mandatory labelling should not be economically
justiﬁed.
8Advantages and disadvantages of GM technology are explained in Science (1999), Pardey (2002)
and Kydd et al. (2000)
5the approvals of new GM crops brought into eﬀect by EU governments, claimed the
adoption of the precautionary principle by the European Parliament meeting public
concerns (environmental impact and public health safety) on the trasngenics. Now
that European legislation has been developed (Directive 2001/18/EC9, Guidelines on
co-existence10, Regulation (EC) 1830/200311 and Regulation (EC) 1829/200312)t h e
moratorium has been lifted and a new variety has been approved to be imported13.
However, farmers’ decision making on whether or not to adopt GM technology is
also inﬂuenced by the current social, economic and political climate.
Domestic farmers in the EU will be induced to adopt the new technology depend-
ing on several factors like public acceptance of GMO. Through the demand of food
processor enterprises which reﬂect consumers’ attitudes to GMO, farmers will be in-
duced to apply conventional technology, instead of GM seed. Reluctant consumers of
GMO will reduce possible GMO crop uses and GM crops will continue to be focussed
on animal feed. Some studies reveal that the adoption and difusion of technology in
Europe vary by trait and crop (Gómez Barberó, M. and Rodriguez Cerezo, E., 2004).
The adoption will be greater if farmers have a clear view of the potential beneﬁts and
if the demand for GM food is guaranteed. In addition, the use of the biotechnology
will be more widely spread if the pest pressure is stronger. Bt maize and Ht soybean,
reduce the use of pesticides, but beneﬁt depends on infestations level. If the avoid-
ance losses of the infestation are lower than the fee paid by GM seed, farmers will
not adopt it.
In other countries, recent data evidence shows a high rate of adoption, especially
in the US, Canada and Argentina, thus reﬂecting growing acceptance of transgenic
crops by farmers using the new technology. Genetically modiﬁed varieties are planted
in 16 countries around the world by 6 million farmers. During the period from 1996 to
2003, the global area of transgenic crops increased 24 fold, from 2.8 million hectares in
9Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on
the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modiﬁed organisms and repealing Council
Directive 90/220/EEC-Commission Declaration.
10Commission Recommendation of 23 July 2003 on guidelines for the development of national
strategies and best practices to ensure the coexistence of genetically modiﬁed crops with conventional
and organic farming (notiﬁed under document C(2003) 2624.
11Regulation (EC) No. 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modiﬁed organims and the traceability
of food and feed products produced from genetically modiﬁed organims and amending Directive
2001/18/EC.
12Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003 on genetically modiﬁed food and feed.
13Commission Decision of 19 July 2004 concernning the placing on the market of Maize product
(Zea mais L. line NK603) genetically modiﬁed for glyphosate tolerance). Notiﬁed under document
numberC(2004) 2761. (2004 643/EC).The authorization today covers the speciﬁc use of this maize
for feed. The product may be used like any other maize, with the exception of cultivation and uses
as or in food.
61996 to 67.7 million hectares in 2003 (cf. ISAAA, 2003). By type of crop, industrial
crops are relatively more important, so GM maize, cotton, soya and colza increased
the arable area in 2002. In fact, GM soya represents 50% of soya arable land in the
world.
In the EU the agricultural landscape has rapidly been changing rapidly towards
industrial crops in recent years. There has been a rise in conventional industrial
crops that grew by a factor of nearly ﬁve between 1975 and 1997. Although this spe-
cialization potentially beneﬁts GM farmer adoption, other factors, like the previously
mentioned relatively strong aversion to GM technology, together with the lack of price
reduction due to market imperfection, could prevent GM wider use among farmers.
In this sense, consolidation in the European seed industry is revealed by important
changes that have been taking place among agrobiotechnology companies, such as
company mergers. The most important mergers include the forming of Syngenta (by
Novartis and Zeneca Agrochemicals) in the year 2000, the Merger by Pioneer Hi-Bred
International with Dupont in 2002, as well as the acquisition of Aventis Crop Science
by Bayer in 2002. (Lheureux, K., M. et al. 2003).
Two factors may have accounted for this consolidation in the European seed in-
dustry: a) the combination of R&D in novel biotechnology techniques in agricultural
applications by ﬁrms with prior experience in industrial chemicals; and b) acquisitions
representing eﬃcient instruments of obtaining the smaller ﬁrms’ intellectual property
and know-how, this being simpler than replication.
Although this concentration in agrifood biotechnology does not mean lack of com-
petition, the resulting industry might not operate eﬃciently due to price distortions.
On the one hand, these monopolistic ﬁrms are capable of charging monopoly rent,
extracting a part of the total static social welfare. On the other hand, Schumpeter
(1942) shows that the monopolisation may increase long term social welfare through
an increased rate of investment in R&D. Demont and Tollens (1999) suggest that al-
though extremely high adopting rates of biotechnology groups in the US reﬂect that
farmers are clearly receiving some beneﬁts, this picture can not be extrapolate to the
EU.
To sum up, this lack of price reductions for GM products, in addition to the
relatively high aversion to GM technology in the EU could result in welfare losses for
consumers, and the desirability of mandatory labelling by consumers grows.
However, public intervention through regulation could be considered justiﬁed
when these legal instruments contribute to increases in social eﬃciency, although
allocation of beneﬁts will necessarily occur. Some ﬁrms hold the view that the cost of
proactively segregating and labelling GMO products exceeds consumers’ willingness
to pay (Phillips and Corkindale, 2002). In the next section we analize theoretically
the implications of mandatory labellling regulation for the diﬀerent agents in the
agrifood chain
73 Theoretical Framework
We will consider two scenarios before and after the mandatory labelling regulation.
Diﬀerent agents involved in the agrifood chain are taken into account:
a) In the ﬁrst stage, biotechnology ﬁrms are responsible for supplying seed to
farmers (both conventional and genetically modiﬁed seeds). Prices are determined by
these two inputs in the seed market. As both goods are imperfect substitutes, relative
price changes will aﬀect farmers’ demand. In addition, market structure will inﬂuence
price determination. In this way, the seed industry, including biotechnology ﬁrms,
is concentrated, and has increased its market power by merging. We will assume a
monopolistically competitive market structure.
b) In the second stage, the crop market faces farmers, as suppliers, and food
processors, who demand these two types of crops (conventional or genetically modiﬁed
crops) as inputs in their production process. We will assume a competitive market
structure.
c) Finally, the third stage represents the ﬁnal food market, which includes con-
sumers and enterprises supplying conventional or transgenic foods. Here the hypoth-
esis of competitive market is also applied.
In each of the three markets we will determine prices (seed prices, crop prices
and food prices) for conventional (Ps, Pc, Pf) and genetically modiﬁed products
(Psg, Pcg, Pfg) and quantities (Qs, Qc, Qf, and Qsg, Qcg, and Qfg, respectively).
Discrepancies in the conventional and GM products will lead to diﬀerences in the
evolution of prices, thus aﬀecting relative welfare of each agent in the agrifood chain.
These welfare implications will depend on the regulatory scenario considered.
Firstly, we describe the situation prior to the enforcement of labeling regula-
tion.(See ﬁgure 2).
I) Biotechnological ﬁr m sr e s e a r c ha n dd e v e l o pG Ms e e d s ,m o d i ﬁed to express a
particularly useful agronomic trait. As a result of the technological change, farmers
may reduce cost of production or increase yield. These eﬃciency gains are reﬂected
in their production functions, which shift to the right for the adopter farmers. The
demand for genetically modiﬁed input, as a value of the marginal productivity, also
shifts to the right. In a competitive market, this technological change would mostly
aﬀect the crop quantities supplied by farmers. But, considering the monopolistic
structure of biotechnology enterprises (supply seed curve is less ﬂat) , the impacts
of innovations would induce a higher increase in the modiﬁed seed prices (Psg). The
prices of innovations in turn aﬀect its adoption and, as a result, reduce crop supply.
Consequently, European farmers will be induced to use GMOs if there is a change in
the marginal cost of producing the crop either using GMOs or using existing technol-
ogy. Possibly, in other countries, the lack of strong intellectual property protection
results in considerable beneﬁts for farmers through adopting GMOs, by a reduction
in price for seed and then a proﬁt advantage. But, in the EU, with eﬀective property
rights, the owner of the GMO is a monopolist , and the gross margin using existing
8technology would be higher than the farmers’ gross margin using GMO technology.
Thus, the farmers would rationally remain with the old technology, making the spread
and adoption of GM technology minor.
II) If the prices of improved inputs increase, the relative prices of conventional
seed will be lower. Farmers would prefer to maintain the conventional input (or
refuse to adopt new technology), and the demand curve for conventional seed will
shift to the right, increasing both quantities and prices of conventional seed. The less
competitive the market hypothesis, the higher the increases in prices.
III) We could expect some increase in seed quantities, and the crop supply will
shift to the right, reducing crop prices, both for conventional and genetically modiﬁed
markets. Changes in relative prices between conventional and GM crops will also shift
to the left the demand curves in this crop market. So if markup for GM seeds allows
for a supply expansion of modiﬁed crops, and this in turn to relative lower GM crop
prices, demand for conventional crop will shift to the left.
Nevertheless, some agricultural products, like sugar, are heavilly protected in
the EU, implying that these market interventions distort the ﬂow of beneﬁts from
biotechnology R&D in agriculture. Dermont, M. & Tollens, E. (2004) show that since
minimum beet prices are ﬁxed, no important declines are possible. As a result, the
beneﬁts essentially ﬂow to farmers without aﬀecting processors. If no domestic prices
declines are expected by the introduction of the technology, EU consumers will not
gain from the innovation.
IV) In the food market, crops constitute an input in the food process of agrifood
companies. A possible price reduction in crop prices shift the supply function of these
ﬁrms to the right, so allowing for a reduction in prices. Under perfect competition
in the market, this eﬀect will reﬂect a high reduction in food prices. In addition, as
transgenic food and conventional food are substitutes, and consumers are not able
to distinguish the production process technology, the demand functions will reﬂect
changes in relative prices. In this sense, reduction in GM food prices will turn into
a decrease in conventional food demand (the conventional demand function shift to
the left ) and viceversa.
In this ﬁrst scenario we have not considered increase in costs due to market seg-
mentation. Adoption of GM crops in some countries, like the EE.UU. and Canada,
has been so widespread that the bulk handling facilities that had earlier been set up
for non GM crops are now used primarily for GM crops. This means that non-GM
crops must now be handled in a way that preserves identity and which is signiﬁcantly
more expensive than the bulk handling system (Lence and Hayes, 2002) As identiﬁ-
cation costs increase with the share of GM grain it would be expected to be higher
in the near future.
In addition, although we could observe reduction in food prices, consumers will
not be able to distinguish between GM and conventional food, they choose to observe
only changes in prices. But some consumer preferences trying to reduce risks (safety
and environmental) are not considered, and would reduce welfare eﬀects. Voluntary
9labelling goes to market segmentation and could inform the consumers. However,
competitive ﬁrms will not consider labelling GM products as this is assumed to be
a negative attribute for European consumers. Problems of asymmetric information
could emerge. Mandatory labelling regulation tries to solve this eﬃciency problem. In
the second scenario we will study the changes in prices resulting from the technological
change, relative price changes and also emerging costs, such as identity perservation
costs (storage), labelling, testing and certiﬁcation. (See ﬁgure 3).
I) The consideration of these additional costs tend to increase input and output
prices. Crops and food supply curves will move to the left. This, partially, compen-
sates, for the reduction in prices induced by technological change.
II) In addition, consumers’ preferences towards conventional food would be re-
ﬂected in an increase of the food demand, and so in prices. Finally, the increase in
the demand of conventional food will reduce GM food prices.
III) In conclusion, as a result of this policy, reduction in prices (assuming perfect
market competition) will not continue. There will be forces which push the prices
in opposite directions (labelling costs and consumers’ preferences towards GM free
food). Carrying out this expensive policy (increasing costs and prices) will depend
on the possibility of compensating for these welfare losses. Next, we will examine
the welfare eﬀects for farmers and food processors. Then, we summarize gains for
consumers.
3.1 Crop Market
We will focus on the farmers and producer welfare measure changes as a result of
the mandatory labelling regulation. European regulation will noy only aﬀect ﬁnal
food production, but also the input market. Genetically modiﬁed seeds represent a
relevant input for farmers production. Although farm-level evidence suggests that
intermediate consumption and seed and plant costs represent just 6.8% of the total
input cost in European agricultural enterprises, (in the year 2000, The Farm Ac-
countancy Data Network), the adoption of GM crops by farmers reduces the costs of
production by improving agronomic properties, such as herbicide tolerance and resis-
tance to particular insect pests. Innovations aﬀect the production process in diﬀerent
ways. First, GM crops technology impact on the product quantity, increasing plant
resistance to insects or tolerance to certain herbicides, and, hence, indirectly on the
unit cost. 14
Nevertheless, Spain is the only country in the EU where any signiﬁcant amounts of
GM crops are grown (about 32.000 hectares of Bt maize). In this respect, European
GM adopter farmers are not signiﬁcant yet, partly because of the monopolist market
power of the biotechnology industry. But also, market segmentation implies addi-
14A study by Fernández Cornejo et al. (2003) reveals that the adopter of GM cotton and soybean
did so mainly to increase yields through improved pest control, secondly to decrease pesticide costs,
thirdly to increase planting ﬂexibility, and ﬁnally because of combined reasons.
10tional costs, identity preservation costs, due to the requirements for keeping, storing
and shipping GM seeds separately from traditional varieties to avoid contamination.
In addition, mandatory labelling will provoke increases in this input price, as a result
of testing and certiﬁcation costs to garantee GM free products, for both GM and
conventional seeds.
Suppose that the farmer uses only a single variable input, seeds. We will ﬁrst
consider in this simple framework the change in productivity (z)as a result of these
biotechnological innovations and changes in the output prices (pcg) together, for the
farmers adopting GM technology in Europe. Then we will examine the eﬀects on
the conventional farmers which should compensate for the increases in conventional
seed prices. Finally, we will add the increases to the marginal costs as a result of the
segregation and mandatory labelling regulation.
3.1.1 GM crop market ex ante mandatory labelling
Productivity changes and output changes in the GM crop market Let
qcgdenote the quantity of genetically modiﬁed crop produced by European farmers
and pcg t h ep r i c e si nt h eE u r o p e a nm a r k e tf o rt h eg e n e t i c a l l ym o d i ﬁed crops. D
represents the demand for these crops by the food processors industry in Europe.
S stands for the farmers’ supply for GM crops, which will shift to the right as a
result of the productivity increases. The welfare eﬀects of the introduction of GM
crops for the processing industry will be the gain area b + c + d (from area a to area
a+b +c +d). Adopters farmers surplus is the area b +e before innovation and area
e + f + g after innovation. So the gain for innovating farmers (or loss if negative) is
the area f +g −b. If f +g>binnovator farmers gain. Otherwise they will lose. Net
gain will be c + d + f + g.
Here Figure 4.
Formally, adopter farmers changes of welfare could be measured by Compensation
Variation (CV) or Producers Surplus (PS) changes as a quasirent (R) changes:

































Where z0 in the previous expression (1) represents the inital technological situ-
ation before the adoption of GM seed. Now we introduce the changes in the food
processors’ demand as a result of the relative changes in conventional crop prices.
11We will expect increases in GM seed to turn to demand for conventional seed and
also increases in prices (see ﬁgure 2). As GM seed is supplied by a monopolistic seed
industry we could consider higher increases in GM than in traditional seeds. It could
aﬀect conventional crop supply by farmers in the crop market that will be shiftted to
the right as an increase in psm related ps .This could reduce pcand, it so, contract GM
demand by food processors. If D in the GM crop market shifts to the left, net welfare
gain will be reduced. We have described this eﬀect in Figure 5. Welfare eﬀect for
food processors will be the gain b+c+d−a0 (from area a+a0 to area a+b+c+d),<
b + c + d obtained previously (Figure 4). Welfare eﬀects for innovators farmers will
also be reduced . Before innovation farmers surplus will be b+b0 +e, and after tech-
nological change e + f + g, resulting in a welfare eﬀects area f + g − b − b0.Net gain
will be c + d + f + g − a0 − b0 <c+ d + f + g obtained previously.
In addition, monopoly power could also contribute to reduced farmers’welfare
gains. Hence, the higher the market power of biotechnology industry to increases psg,
the lower the shift of the farmers’ supply as a result of increases in productivity and
quantities of crops production (q0
cgto q1
cg).
3.1.2 Conventional Crop Market ex ante mandatory labelling
Changes in relative prices Let qc denote the quantity of conventional counterpart
crop produced by European farmers and pc t h ep r i c e si nt h eE u r o p e a nm a r k e tf o rt h e
conventional crops. D represents the demand for these crops by the food processor
industry in Europe. S is the farmers’ supply for conventional crops, which will shift
to the right as a result of changes in relative prices. As we showed in Figure 1, we may
expect that due to the increase in GM seed prices, the relative prices of conventional
seed will be lower.
The results are similar to the GM crop market. Welfare eﬀects as a result of the
innovation process in the conventional crop market for the processing industry will
be the gain area b+c+d (from area a to area a+b+c+d). Farmers who remain with
the old technology surplus is the area b + e before changes and area e + f + g after
GM introduction. So, the gain for traditional farmers (or loss if negative) is the area
f + g − b. If f + g>btraditional farmers gain. Otherwise they lose. Net gain will
be c + d + f + g. As in the GM market, changes in the Demand position to the left
as a result of reduction by processor industry would be expected if GM crop prices
decrease.This change will reduce net gains.
3.1.3 GM and conventional crop markets after mandatory labelling reg-
ulation
With mandatory labelling, possible reduction in crop prices will be compensated for
an increase in identiﬁcation and preservation costs. Those costs would aﬀect both GM
and conventional crops, as we describe in ﬁgure 3. However, if share of GM crops
increases in the EU in the future, only farmers who intend to receive a premium
12by selling GM free products (or less than 1% of GM crops) will have to pay those
costs. Nowadays, as EU farmers mainly produce conventional crops, identiﬁcation
and preservation costs increase marginal production costs of exporters to the EU. At
present, only Spain has a signiﬁcant share of landcrop maize with GM seeds. We will
expect these costs to aﬀe c td o m e s t i cf a r m e r si nt h en e a rf u t u r ew i t ht h eh y p o t h e s i s
that the adoption of the new technology will be generalized.
Figure 6 shows that the welfare eﬀects of the mandatory labelling of GM crops for
the processing industry will be the lost area b+c(from area a+b+c to area a. Adopter
farmers’ surplus is the area d+e+f before regulation and area d+b afterwards. So
the loss for innovating farmers (or gain if positive) is the area b−(e+f). If b>e+f
innovator farmers gain. Otherwise they will lose. Net loss will be −(c + e + f).
Welfare eﬀect will also change as a result of the mandatory labelling legislation.
Which of these markets would be more aﬀected depends on the increase of mar-
ginal costs in each market. The welfare eﬀect could be measured by the folllowing
expression of changes in quasirents:

































Where w0 in the previous expression (2) represents the initial marginal cost for
the innovator farmer before the segregation of the market, and w1 includes the iden-
tiﬁcation and preservation costs after the mandatory labelling.
3.2 Food Market
In this section we study changes in the welfare of consumers and food market proces-
sors, taking into account both scenarios, before and after mandatory labelling reg-
ulation. As we show in Figure 2, in the ﬁrst scenario, ex ante the implementation
of mandatory regulation, welfare eﬀects on crop and food markets are similar, as we
could also expect changes in supply due to input prices (in this market, crop is an
input to the food processor industry and will be reduced) and changes in demand of
consumers as a result of relative prices changes -GM food and conventional food-.In
that sense, explanations for conventional and GM crop market before regulation could
also be introduced here. (see ﬁgure 7).
As far as reduction in food prices is concerned, consumers gain and food processors
would reduce their previous gains in the crop market. Net gain will be c + d + f +
g − a0 − b0.As consumers can not diﬀerenciate between both types of food, their
choice is based on prices and we could not expect changes in demand function due
13to quality perceptions. Only if voluntary labelling by food processors is generalized,
will conventional food demand shift to the right, increasing conventional food prices
as we will explain for mandatory regulation.
Figure 3 summarizes the eﬀects on the food market as a result of mandatory
labelling. Two principal changes are introduced: increases in the marginal cost of
production for food processors and changes in consumer preferences. The former is
t h er e s u l to ft h ei d e n t i ﬁcation costs passed from the crop market to the food market.
This increase in costs will shift the supply curve to the left, contributing to increases
in market prices, both for conventional and GM food. The latter, changes in consumer
preferences, is the result of the additional information provided for the food market.
If preferences continue to reﬂect GM aversion, the demand function will shift to the
r i g h tf o rc o n v e n t i o n a lf o o d ,a n dt ot h el e f tt oG Mf o o d .W ed e s c r i b et h e s ec h a n g e s
in the next section.
3.2.1 GM and conventional food markets after mandatory labelling reg-
ulation
Figure 8 shows that the welfare eﬀects of the mandatory labelling of GM food for the
consumers will be the lost area b +c(from area a+ b +c to area a). Food processors
s u r p l u si st h ea r e ad + e + f before regulation and area d + b afterwards. So the
loss for innovating industry (or gain if positive) is the area b − (e + f). If b>e+ f
innovator food processors gain. Otherwise they lose. Net loss will be −(c + e + f).
For conventional food we expect a major increase in food prices due to consumer
preferences for GM-free food. Figure 8 shows these changes in consumer and producer
surplus.
To continue buying conventional food after mandatory labelling implies a welfare
eﬀect on consumer and food processors as described in ﬁgure 9.
Consumer surplus changes from area (a+a0+b) to area (a0+b0),w i t han e tn e g a t i v e
eﬀect of (b0−a−b) These increases in prices cause a change to the producer surplus
form area (c + d) to area (c + a + e), resulting in a net eﬀect of (a + e − d). Higher
preferences towards free GM food increase welfare eﬀects on food processors as area
ewill be higher, and relative higher increases in marginal costs from identiﬁcation
costs result in lower gains to food processors, as area d will be higher. Net eﬀect in
this conventional food market will be the sum of net eﬀects for consumer and food
processors, that is the area: e+b0−b−d. This area will represent net gain if changes
in preferences increases b0and ein a way that compensates for changes in marginal
cost that increases b + d.
The following table summarizes net eﬀect in crop and food markets.
Nevertheless, consumer welfare eﬀects should be measured accurately by introduc-
ing changes in quality diﬀerent from changes in prices, not observed and quantiﬁed
in the food market, as a result of the additional information included on the label
after regulation.
144C o n c l u s i o n s
The social unacceptability of GMO technologies in the European Union (EU) has
been considered a factor that foregoes substantial beneﬁts in terms of welfare (Meijl
and Tongeren, 2004). In this paper we present a simple framework to explain how
mandatory labelling, as an instrument that reﬂects consumption rejections to GMO
technologies, aﬀects the actors in the food chain diferently. Before the mandatory
labelling regulation the difussion of GM innovations could have negatively aﬀected
consumers’ welfare as a result of some important regional economic factors. Con-
sumers would have been worse oﬀ due to food prices increases both in conventional
and GM food. These higher prices will be the result of a) monopolist power of seed
suppliers that prevents the transmission of cost savings and b) European market in-
terventions through Common Agricultural Policy that protects agricultural prices.
So, EU consumers will not gain from the innovation. In that scenario mandatory
labelling regulation for transgenic food in the EU has been adopted following inter-
est groups’ demands, like consumer and environmentalists’ associations. But, after
mandatory labelling regulation, segregation costs, including identiﬁcation and preser-
vation costs, also contribute to the increase in prices of conventional and GM prod-
ucts reducing consumer welfare eﬀects. European consumer willingness to pay higher
prices should at least be less than the potential beneﬁtr e s u l to ft h eg a i n si ne ﬃciency
for consumers. So greater access to information (symmetric and perfect information)
provided for consumers, justiﬁed as a consumers’ right to know should compensate
for these consumer losses. Otherwise, not including qualities other than changes to
prices, reduces welfare for consumers in both transgenic and conventional food.
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Ex ante          
 -GM   gain/loss  gain  gain/loss  gain 
 -Conventional  gain/loss  gain  gain/loss  gain 
Ex post         
 -GM  gain/loss  loss  gain/loss  loss 
 -Conventional  gain/loss  loss  gain  loss 
 